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1. INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have established that aggregating judgments or predictions across individuals can
be surprisingly accurate in a variety of domains, including prediction markets, political polls, game
shows, and forecasting (see Surowiecki, 2004). Under Galton’s (1907) conditions of individuals having
largely unbiased and independent judgments, the aggregated judgment of a group of individuals is un-
controversially better, on average, than the individual judgments themselves (e.g., Armstrong, 2001;
Clemen, 1989; Galton, 1907; Surowiecki, 2004; Winkler, 1971). The boundary conditions of crowd wis-
dom, however, are not as well-understood. For example, when group members are allowed access to
other members’ predictions, as opposed to making them independently, their predictions become more
positively correlated and the crowd’s performance can diminish (Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Hel-
bing, 2011). In the context of handicapping sports results, individuals have been found to make sys-
tematically biased predictions, so that their aggregated judgments may not be wise (Simmons, Nelson,
Galak, & Frederick, 2011). How robust is crowd wisdom to factors such as non-independence and bias
of crowd members’ judgments? If the conditions for crowd wisdom are less than ideal, is it better to
aggregate judgments or, for instance, rely on a skilled individual judge? Would it be better to add a
highly skilled crowd member or a less skilled one who makes systematically different predictions than
other members, increasing diversity?
We provide a simple, precise definition of the wisdom-of-the-crowd effect and a systematic way to
examine its boundary conditions. We define a crowd as wise if a linear aggregate of its members’
judgments of a criterion value has less expected squared error than the judgments of an individual
sampled randomly, but not necessarily uniformly, from the crowd. Previous definitions of the wisdom
of the crowd effect have largely focused on comparing the crowd’s accuracy to that of the average in-
dividual member (Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 2012). Our definition generalizes prior approaches in a
couple of ways. We consider crowds created by any linear aggregate, not just simple averaging. Second,
our definition allows the comparison of the crowd to an individual selected according to a distribution
that could reflect past individual performance, e.g., their skill, or other attributes. On the basis of our
definition, we develop a framework for analyzing crowd wisdom that includes various aggregation and
sampling rules. These rules include both weighting the aggregate and sampling the individual accord-
ing to skill, where skill is operationalized as predictive validity, i.e., the correlation between a judge’s
prediction and the criterion. Although the amount of the crowd’s wisdom - the expected difference be-
tween individual error and crowd error - is non-linear in the amount of bias and non-independence
of the judgments, our results yield simple and general rules specifying when a simple average will be
wise. While a simple average of the crowd is not always wise if individuals are not sampled uniformly
at random, we show that there always exists some a priori aggregation rule that makes the crowd wise.
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1.1 Preliminaries
Consider a set of N -many decision makers (DMs) where each DM makes a judgment about the un-
known value of a criterion. We model the criterion being predicted (or estimated) by the group members
as a random variable with finite mean and variance. In this way, we conceptualize our framework as
applying to random criteria, as in prediction, as well as to the special cases of estimating a single fixed
quantity (which we accommodate by setting the variance of the criterion to 0). We take this criterion
value to be a random variable, Y, with mean µy and variance σ2y.
Similarly, we assume that each DM’s judgment is a random variable. This assumption represents
the variability of a DM who gives variable responses to the same task. With this assumption, we can
model how a DM’s predictions correlate with the criterion as well as other DMs in the crowd. Let
the prediction distribution of the ith DM be the random variable Xi with mean µxi and variance σ2xi.
A crowd prediction, denoted C, is defined as the random variable formed by linearly combining the
DMs according to predetermined weights wi, C =
∑N
i=1 wiXi, with the restriction that all wi’s are non-
negative and, to ensure uniqueness,
∑N
i=1 wi = 1. The weights, wi, are not random variables, but rather
fixed choices of how to combine crowd member judgments.
We consider whether the crowd’s judgment is expected to be better than an individual crowd mem-
ber’s. Let P be the random variable formed by selecting a single member of the crowd probabilistically,
and let pi denote the probability of selecting the ith crowd member, with pi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
and
∑N
i=1 pi = 1. As a special case, if all pi values are equal, i.e., pi =
1
N ,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, then P
reduces to selecting any individual DM with equal probability. Note that we place no a priori restric-
tions on the µxi and σ2xi values. This allows for the possibility that DMs are biased, meaning that their
average judgment would not equal the average criterion value, E[Xi] = µxi 6= µy. Also note that we
allow DMs to have different prediction variances, σ2xi, and arbitrary covariances with other DMs where
σxi,xj denotes the covariance of Xi and Xj . In other words, the judgments of the crowd members may
be correlated with each other.
We define accuracy as the average squared error of prediction (whether a group or individual). This is
a common “gold standard” accuracy metric within the field statistics (Lehmann & Casella, 1998). This
accuracy metric allows us to derive distribution-free results on crowd wisdom. In other words, we make
no assumptions regarding the underlying distributional form of the individual or group’s predictions,
such as normality, nor do we impose any constraints on the distribution’s shape such as symmetry or
unimodality. Alternative accuracy definitions (e.g., average absolute error) can change the conclusions
of our model, though our approach is one that could, in theory, be extended to any accuracy metric.
1.2 Our Model
We define a wisdom of the crowd effect to hold if, and only if,
E[(C − Y)2] ≤ E[(P − Y)2], (1)
for some crowd aggregate weights, wi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and selection distribution probability weights
pi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Note that the right-hand side of this inequality is the expected accuracy of se-
lecting an individual according to an arbitrary, pre-specified probability distribution, in contrast to
previous formulations such as evaluating the arithmetic mean accuracy of individual predictions (Lar-
rick, Mannes, & Soll, 2012).
The aggregate crowd prediction distribution, C, defined by w, has lower expected loss than an indi-
vidual judgment selected according to the probability measure, pi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, if, and only if, the
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following inequality holds:
(µ′Xw − µy)2 +w′ΣXXw − 2w′σxy + σ2y ≤
N∑
i=1
pi[(µxi − µy)2 + σ2xi − 2σyxi + σ2y]. (2)
This inequality provides an explicit, testable condition to determine whether a given crowd is wise.
We demonstrate how this result can be used to evaluate the relative trade-offs of group member inter-
dependence versus bias as well as how to apply this model to data. In the paper, we examine many
possible choices of crowd weights and individual selection probabilities.
1.3 Results
Our results suggest that crowd wisdom is robust to different choices of aggregation and sampling
rules. That is, how one aggregates the judgments or chooses an individual judge rarely affects the
qualitative conclusion that even a crowd that is a simple average of judges is wiser than the individual.
By identifying conditions for crowd wisdom, our results also provide guidance for constructing an
optimally wise group - a group whose accuracy most exceeds that of its individual members - with
two surprising conclusions emerging. First, a crowd becomes wisest when it is maximally informative,
which entails that its members’ judgments are as negatively correlated with each other as possible,
as opposed to being independent. Thus, the best judge to add to a crowd is one that is maximally
different from others. One intuitive analogy of this result is to think of the group as a financial portfolio:
Sometimes it is better to diversify performance by “hedging” and including an asset that performs well
when other assets perform poorly. This result provides mathematical support for the idea that crowds
with more diversity are wiser (Hong & Page, 2004). Further, our theoretical framework provides a
mechanism for determining when it would be better for the overall group prediction to add a group
member who, perhaps, is less skilled than the alternative members, but provides diverse predictions.
In other words, our framework provides a quantification of the accuracy-diversity trade-off.
A second surprising conclusion is that while the absolute accuracy of the crowd depends on the di-
rection and magnitude of members’ bias, it is almost always preferable to use a weighted aggregate of
judgments rather than select the single best group member, even if the crowd members are biased. Un-
less the best group member can be selected deterministically, as in certain intellective tasks (Laughlin,
1996), the decrease in variance of predictions caused by aggregating judgments will offset the bias, a
manifestation of the well-known bias/variance tradeoff (Gigone & Hastie, 1997).
We present an application of our framework to experimental studies by re-analyzing the data col-
lected, analyzed and published by Vul and Pashler (2008) and Simmons, Nelson, Galak, and Frederick
(2011). Our analysis finds a “wisdom of the crowd” effect when applied to the group of individuals
from Vul and Pashler (2008), extending the original analysis which examined the accuracy of pooled
repeated judgments within individuals. Our re-analysis of the Simmons et al. (2011) data supports
the overall treatment effect of increasing individual bias by manipulating the sports betting infor-
mation available to them. In contrast to the original findings reported by Simmons et al. (2011), our
re-analysis, guided by our new formulation, finds an overall improvement of the crowd’s predictions
relative to individuals across all treatments in the study. In other words, while the members are indi-
vidually biased and the crowd not particularly accurate, the crowd is still wise relative to the individ-
ual.
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